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 ,QWURGXFWLRQ
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) was formally adopted by the third session of the Conference of the Parties (COP-
3) on 11 December 1997. The Protocol establishes a legally binding obligation on Annex I
countries (the industrialised countries) to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) on
average by 5.2% below 1990 levels by the years 2008-2012. Norway is committed to limit the
emissions to below a level of 101% of the 1990-emissions. The quotas are defined as baskets
covering the six (groups of) gases CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF6.
There is a complex array of alternative approaches that can be adopted by individual Annex I
countries to achieve their particular emission targets. At the domestic level the countries are
free to choose their preferred policies and measures best suited to economic circumstances,
community concerns and other national criteria.
Among the most important policy instruments domestically we have:
• taxes.
• tradable permits.
• regulations, voluntary agreements, joint projects and other non-market based
instruments.
The Protocol provides however also flexible instruments or mechanisms – lately called the
Kyoto mechanisms – at the international level. The individual countries are free to acquire
quotas from other countries through:1
• Emissions trading with other Annex I countries.
• Joint implementation (JI) projects in other Annex I countries.
• The funding of emission reduction projects in developing countries verified and
accepted by the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).
The emission reduction commitments specified in the Kyoto Protocol will be achieved
through a mix of the above listed policies and mechanisms. This complex set of policy
instruments and flexible mechanisms therefore raises the question of how the different
instruments interacts with each other.
How will for example joint implementation and CDM influence the international quota
market? What is the future of domestic climate policies based on emission taxes if a well
functioning quota market is established at the international level? How will a market for
tradable permits at the domestic level relate to voluntary agreements, joint projects and other
non-market-based instruments? These and other related questions are the topics of this report.
The report is outlined as follows. In the following section (section 2) we describe the non-
market based instruments. In the third section we look at the market based instruments and
                                                          
1
 In addition to the listed mechanisms, Article 4 in the Kyoto Protocol opens for establishing so-called “bubbles”.
The article is specifically designed in order to let the EU reallocate its quotas among the EU member states. Also
other groups of countries could establish bubbles and apply this article. The reallocation of quotas under this
article has to be finalised before ratification. It will therefore not serve as a substitute for efficient emissions
trading.
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flexible mechanisms. In the fourth section we discuss how the instruments and the mechanism
relates to each other both at the international and the national level, while the fifth and final
section concludes.
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 5HJXODWLRQVYROXQWDU\DJUHHPHQWVDQGRWKHU
QRQPDUNHWEDVHGLQVWUXPHQWV
 5HJXODWLRQV
Direct regulations, often described as “command and control”, can be classified as either
technology-based or performance-based. Technology-based regulation typically requires use
of specified equipment, processes, or procedures. In the context of climate change policy,
technology based regulations could require application of particular types of energy-efficient
motors, combustion processes, or landfill gas collection technologies.
Performance based regulations are specifying allowable levels of pollutant emissions or
polluting activities, but leaving the specific methods of achieving those levels to the regulated
private entities. Examples of performance based regulations for GHG abatement include, in
addition to traditional firm-specific emission caps, for example minimum levels of energy
efficiency for appliances and maximum levels of methane emissions from landfills.
Direct regulation can also take the form of absolute bans of certain products or processes,
such as aerosol sprays containing ozone-depleting substances. Taking public administrative
implementation costs of the policies into account, bans may actually be a relatively cost-
effective policy instrument if low-cost substitutes for targeted products are available. In the
case of the climate gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol, bans are however not of much
interest.
Regulations are interesting options when we are dealing with for example pollutants causing
non-linear2 and highly local damages, as is the case with emissions of NOx and non-methane
Volatile Organic Compounds (nmVOC). In the case of climate gases, however, regulations
are not to the same extent of interest. GHG emissions do not causes any local damages to
neither humans nor nature. The consequences in the form of climate change should from a
national point of view be considered as linear in emissions.3
The regulations of the type described above typically lead to economically inefficient
outcomes since firms may be forced to employ unduly expensive means to control pollution.
As mentioned above, such regulations are nevertheless suitable when dealing with certain
local pollution problems. Due to the character of global warming as a global environmental
problem, and due to the fact that costs of controlling emission of climate gases vary among
firms, the use of market-based instruments should be preferred when dealing with climate
gases.
                                                          
2
 This implies for instance that the environmental damages could be neglected at emission levels below certain
threshold values, but disastrous above these thresholds.
3
 We are of course aware of the fact that global warming and climate change are far from linear functions of the
concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere. Nevertheless, it is a good approximation to consider the reduced
damages as linear functions of national abatement levels when discussing reasonable and realistic emission
reductions. The point is that the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere is a long term process where limited
emission reductions in a single country at a certain point in time has limited effects on atmospheric
concentrations.
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 9ROXQWDU\DJUHHPHQWV
The distinction between voluntary agreements and traditional regulation as described above is
in principle not very sharp. However, one important difference is that while direct regulations
are based on new laws coming into force, voluntary agreements are grounded on negotiated
agreements between the regulating authorities and the emitting industries.
I some countries voluntary agreements have played an important role in national GHG-
abatement policies. The threat of mandatory government interventions may be enough to
encourage voluntary agreements. Forward-looking firms may undertake some steps in
controlling GHG emissions if they fear more costly mandatory controls in the absence of
voluntary reductions. Also, voluntary agreements are sometimes seen as a way of obtaining
emission permits that later may become tradable. Voluntary agreements could furthermore be
a reasonable alternative if there are only a small number of emitters, as is the case with the
Norwegian emissions of SF6.
 5HJXODWLRQVDQGWKHLUUHODWLRQWRPDUNHWEDVHGLQVWUXPHQWV
Direct regulation and voluntary agreements will probably play a minor role in future climate
policy, at least if the Kyoto-protocol enters into force and an international market for quotas
emerge. We will return to this in the next section, where we discuss market-based
instruments. The voluntary agreement between the Norwegian authorities and the Norwegian
aluminium industry on GHG emission reductions will for example be of minor importance if
a national system for emissions trading is established. When the flexible instruments are
designed and implemented, the authorities must nevertheless take their commitments in
existing voluntary agreements into account.
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 0DUNHWEDVHGLQVWUXPHQWVDQGIOH[LEOH
PHFKDQLVPV
Due to the likeliness of considerable costs of meeting the targets specified in the Kyoto
Protocol, one of the central issues in the negotiations have been the inclusion of so called
IOH[LEOHPHFKDQLVPVin the Protocol. The flexible mechanisms included in the Kyoto Protocol
are emissions trading and joint implementation among Annex I countries and the possibility
for acquiring emission quotas through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Also at
the national level there are several different policy options. We now turn our attention to the
two main market-based instruments; emission taxes and tradable permits and quotas. Later on
we focus at joint implementation and CDM, instruments that can facilitate technology
transfer, but that are not to the same degree cost-effective.
Before we discuss taxes and tradable permits, it should be made clear that these instruments
are in many respects quite similar. In a perfectly competitive marketplace, and under either an
emission tax or a tradable permit scheme, emitters would reduce emissions to the point where
the marginal cost of control equals the emission tax-rate or the equilibrium price of an
emission permit (quota price). If the total emission reductions are equal in the two systems,
the permit price will be equal to the tax rate. In other words, the two systems give the emitters
identical incentives to change their behaviour. Both instruments would also provide dynamic
efficiency, since each provides a continuous incentive for research and development in
emission abatement technologies to avoid the tax or permit purchases. If the permits are
distributed through auctions, the collected revenues and consequently the double dividends
are also identical in the two systems.'RXEOHGLYLGHQGV
CO2-taxes or auctioned tradable permits as domestic instruments to secure
compliance with the Kyoto Protocol, may give rise to truly significant amounts of
revenue. This revenue can be recycled, i.e. reimbursed into the private sector
through reductions in existing taxes. It is well known that high tax rates are
damaging to economic efficiency. Recycling revenue from environmental policies
will therefore increase efficiency and is therefore welfare improving. Because CO2-
taxes both have a positive environmental effect and generate public revenue that
could be used for welfare-improving tax reductions, we talk about double
dividends.
There is no doubt that environmental policies generating public revenue will give rise
to double dividends if the revenue is recycled properly. The discussion in economic
literature on the double dividends is on the size, not on the existence of such
dividends. Claiming the existence of double dividends does not imply, however, that
the environmental goals can be reached at zero or negative costs. The point is that the
use of policy instruments that generates public revenues reduces the costs compared to
policies that do not generate such revenues. Cf. Bohm (1998), Hoel (1998) and
Goulder (1995) for further readings.10
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 *UHHQKRXVHJDVHPLVVLRQWD[HV
The aim of using a GHG tax is to minimise the total economic costs of achieving a given
overall emission target. If all emitters of GHGs have to pay the same tax pr. unit emission,
they will all have identical incentives to reduce the emissions at the margin. This will lead to a
cost-effective distribution of abatement efforts among emitters.
If, on the other hand, the emission taxes are differentiated across sectors, the allocation of
abatement efforts will not be cost-effective. The sectors that pay high tax rates will have
inefficiently high incentives to reduce their emissions, while the sectors with low or no
emission taxes will have inefficiently small incentives for performing abatement efforts.
In Norway a CO2-tax was introduced in 19914. For political reasons the Norwegian process
industry was however exempted from this tax. Furthermore, the tax rates vary considerable
across sectors and fuels, cf. figure 1.
After an adjustment of the CO2-tax in 1998, the Norwegian offshore oil industry is subject to
the highest tax rate; NOK 462.- pr. tonnes CO2. Most manufacturing industries on the
mainland are either exempted or subject to a tax-rate below NOK 200 pr tonnes CO2. This
system gives rise to costly CO2-abatement efforts in the oil industry, while several low cost
abatement measures on the mainland are not carried out. This leads to inefficient use of
resources. Larger emission reductions could have been carried out with identical or even
smaller use of resources.
)LJXUH&2WD[HVLQ1RUZD\DGMXVWHGIRULQIODWLRQ
                                                          
4
 It is to a large extent a misrepresentation to label this tax a CO2-tax, because it, due to differentiation and
exemptions, in reality is not proportional to the CO2-emissions.
&2WD[HVLQ1RUZD\DGMXVWHGIRULQIODWLRQ
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In section 4 we will return to the question of whether a domestic emission tax may be an
appropriate and suitable policy instrument in the presence of a well-behaving international
market for quotas.
 7UDGDEOHSHUPLWVDWWKHQDWLRQDOOHYHO
One very attractive feature of a competitive tradable domestic permit scheme is that the final
allocation of abatement efforts will be the one that minimizes the total costs of reducing
emissions. This will happen no matter how the initial permits are distributed, through auctions
or by so called “grandfathering”. Grandfathering of permits means that the permits are
distributed without charge to emitters, most commonly according to the emitters’ historical
emissions.
A precondition for a tradable permit market to give rise to a cost-effective allocation of
abatement efforts is that there are no restrictions on the trade. Firms will then want to buy
permits if abatement costs exceed the permit price and sell permits in the opposite case. In
this way, trade will continue until all firms have marginal abatement costs that are equal to the
permit price.
 'LVWULEXWLRQRIWKHSHUPLWV
It is probably not very practical to involve households and small firms directly into a domestic
permit market, although new information technology makes it more feasible to do so now
than previously and individual emission permits certainly would give strong incentives for
changes in our way of life. Nevertheless, it is probably more practical for the national
government to issue emission permits to for example wholesale dealers in fossil fuels and
allow them to trade on the domestic permit market. The small firms and the households will
then indirectly pay for the emissions they are responsible for through the wholesale dealers
who will include the permit price in the consumer prices.
As already mentioned, the governments could distribute permits to individual firms in two
ways. In the first case, firms would be given - free of charge - shares of the total permit
volume based on their historical emissions, for example 1990-emissions, or recent fuel sales
(“grandfathering”). The other alternative is for the government to sell or auction the set of
permits. A combination of these two distribution methods is also an option. The auctions
could start with the seller announcing a high price, almost certainly too high for all permits to
be sold. The bids could then be lowered until the price is reached which clears the market.
The two distribution methods differ primarily with respect to the wealth distribution between
the public sector and the individual firms. Grandfathering implies a “transfer” of wealth in the
form of tradable permits to the firms. Auctions imply that the wealth is transferred to the
public sector. The government would then collect revenue similar to that from a GHG tax,
giving rise to the same total emission reduction. As with taxes, auctions could be used to
reduce pre-existing, distorting taxes and consequently give rise to a double dividend, cf. the
text box above. Due to the loss of the double dividend, the society’s total cost of reaching a
certain emission target will be higher if grandfathering is used instead of taxes or auctioned
permits.
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In Norway grandfathering has been proposed in order to avoid closing down some of the
export oriented energy intensive firms. From the above it should be clear that this proposal
has to be supplemented by some restrictions on the possibilities for permit sale when firms are
closed down. Fully tradable permits, whether distributed by auction or grandfathered, as well
as taxes will imply identical allocation of abatement efforts and the same firms will choose to
shut down in all instances. Basically, this is because the alternative cost of holding a fully
tradable permit will be equal to the tax rate.
Thus, if grandfathering as such should prevent firms from closing down, grandfathered
permits can not be fully tradable. For example the permits could be given conditional on the
size of the production or the number of employees. Such restrictions on the permit market
will, however, increase the aggregate emission reduction costs, and we can no longer talk of a
cost-effective policy measure. It is important to keep in mind that if a free permit market
causes firms to shut down, this is part of the cost-effective allocation of emission reduction
efforts. Any restrictions on the permit trade in order to prevent such closedowns will move the
market away from a cost-effective allocation.5
As already stated, a combination of grandfathered and auctioned permits is possible. Tradable
permits could also be combined with taxes. Some sectors could be included in a tradable
permit system, while other sectors are subject to an emission tax. If, however, the permit
market becomes very restricted and limited in size, the degree of cost-efficiency will be
reduced. This is because reductions cost will vary less across the limited number of firms etc.
allowed to participate in the quota market. The potential cost savings of a market-based
approach is thus reduced. In addition a small quota market may be less efficient due to
possible strategic behaviour and market power from some of the participants.
Although an emission tax is a cost-effective policy instrument, the development of the Kyoto
Protocol might reduce the importance of GHG taxes in the future. An important precondition
is ratification by the number of parties required for the Protocol to enter into force6. In that
case an international market for quotas might emerge. If the emerging quota market is well
behaved, it is an adjacent option for the national governments to replace eventually existing
GHG taxes with auctioned tradable permits. The number of auctioned permits could be set in
accordance with the Kyoto Protocol commitments.
 'RPHVWLF-RLQW,PSOHPHQWDWLRQ'-,
We have so far discussed direct regulation, voluntary agreements, taxes and permit trading. A
fifth possibility in the domestic arena is that one firm could finance emission reduction
projects in another firm domestically either as a stand alone project or as part of a larger
investment project. We are in other words talking about a national version of Joint
Implementation.
                                                          
5
 As part of a policy to prevent close downs the grandfathered permits could be given a limited lifetime. To have
an effect on the number of closedowns, it must be announced that firms that are shut down will not receive free
permits for the succeeding periods. This is however also a type of restrictions on the permit market that will
move the market away from the settlement or market solution that generates a cost-effective allocation of
abatement efforts.
6
 At least 55 parties to the protocol having more than 55 per cent of the total Annex I CO2 emissions in 1990.
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The motivation behind domestic joint implementation projects is presumably for the investor
to buy future rights to emission permits at a lower price than own reduction costs. Such
transactions will of course have a certain degree of uncertainty associated with them before a
domestic permit market is established.
Even with a domestic permit market in place, three situations need to be distinguished:
1. Both firms (the investor and the reducer) are included in the domestic permit
market,
2. Only one of the firms is included, while the other is either directly regulated or
subject to a greenhouse gas tax,
3. Neither of the firms are included in the market.
In the first case, the joint project is nothing more than a barter trade in permits and should as
such pose no special problems vis a vis the regulating authority.
In the second case we need to distinguish whether the investor or the reducer is included in
the permit market. If the reducer is included, and thus have permits to sell, the question arises
whether the investor will be allowed to sell the acquired permit from ‘outside’ the market;
either to the government in return for GHG tax concessions or in return for a comparable
reduction in emission regulations, or on the international market. As national GHG emissions
are in fact lowered by the joint project and will be recognised in the national emission
inventories, it can be argued that the authorities should in fact recognise the generated permits
as genuine and tradable in the same sense as the permits generated and traded within the
domestic market. If only the investor is included in the domestic permit market, the acquired
permits should of course be as valid as any other permits on the domestic market.
A problem will arise if the GHG tax rate outside the permit market is different from the going
permit price. Tax compensation in return for the generated permit or due to emission
reductions will then entail a loss of public revenue and a similar gain for the regulated firm.
This illustrates a problem with operating several policy regimes at the same time.
Given that the international as well as the domestic permit price is likely to be well blow the
current CO2 tax rate in Norway, the above complications point to the difficulties and arbitrage
opportunities likely to emerge from a mixed policy system comprising both tradable permits
and a tax or regulation scheme. Thus, it seems far better to design a national system around
only one common mechanism or instrument. As the Kyoto protocol already opens for an
international quota market and quota generation through international joint implementation
and CDM, and as major Norwegian emission sources are to be included in a domestic permit
market, it seems only natural to suggest that tradable permit system should be the only control
policy in Norway.
 ,QWHUQDWLRQDOTXRWDWUDGLQJ
Under the Kyoto Protocol the industrialised countries have been allocated legally binding
obligations to limit emissions of GHGs on average by 5.2% below 1990-levels by years 2008-
                                                          
7
 We use the term “quotas” for the national emission limitations specified in the Kyoto Protocol, while “permits”
are used when we talk about domestic emissions trading.
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2012. The Protocol will enter into force 90 days after ratification by at least 55 countries,
which account for at least 55% of the industrialised countries’ total CO2-emissions in 1990.
The USA accounted for 36% of industrialised countries’ total CO2-emissions in 1990. Hence,
it is unlikely that the Protocol will enter into force if the USA does not ratify.
Emission trading is allowed, although the rules for the trade has to be further developed at
future meetings of the parties to the Protocol. The USA will however probably not ratify the
Protocol if there are obstacles in establishing reasonable modalities and rules for the quota
market. If and when the Protocol eventually enters into force, an international market for
quotas will therefore probably emerge.
)LJXUH$EDWHPHQWDQGTXRWDWUDGH
In order to give an impression of what an international quota market might look like, figure 2
presents the trade pattern predicted by the simulation model ACT8. Russia and the other
economies in transition to a market economy (the EIT-countries) are likely to be the main
quota sellers in the quota market. The USA is the main quota buyer due to the high-expected
emission growth in this country. The quota price is estimated to be USD 21.6 pr. tonnes CO2
equivalent.
The negative CO2 reductions predicted in the developing countries is due to so called carbon
leakage: The abatement efforts in the industrialised countries imply reduced demand for fossil
fuels, and consequently lower fossil fuel prices. Lower fossil fuel prices imply increased
combustion of fossil fuels in the developing countries. This carbon leakage is estimated to be
around 14% of the total abatement within the industrialised countries and of approximately
the same size as the total abatement within EU.
                                                          
8
 ACT (Achieving Commitments by Trading) is a model developed at CICERO, cf. CICERO Working Paper
1998:9.
$EDWHPHQWDQGTXRWDWUDGLQJ 
     
86$ 
&DQDGD 
5XVVLD 
2WKHU(,7 
$XVWUDOLDDQG1= 
-DSDQ 
'HYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV 
(8 
0LOOLRQWRQQHV&2HTY 
'RPHVWLF&2DEDWHPHQW 
'RPHVWLFDEDWHPHQWRIRWKHU 
*+*V 
1HWTXRWDLPSRUW 
&,&(525HSRUW
Coordination of flexible instruments in climate policy
16
An international tradable quota scheme could coexist with domestic permit schemes within
each country, or particular countries might choose to meet their commitments by other means
as for example taxes. Both in the case of a domestic tradable permit scheme and in a tax
regime, the government could allow private domestic entities to trade directly on the
international quota market. In the tax case private entities buying quotas on the international
market should have the tax bill reduced when handing the acquired quotas over to the
government. When private entities in the tradable permit case are engaged in cross-border
trade, this must also involve the governments in question. At least the cross border trade must
be reported to the governments, because only the governments have legally binding emission
limits in the Kyoto Protocol.
A system of domestic emission taxes linked to an international quota market as indicated
above is only cost-effective if the domestic tax is equal to the quota price at the international
market. Such a system would in other words require that the tax vary in step with the
international quota price. That would constitute an unconventional form of taxation and is
probably not very practical. If the domestic emitters should be linked to the international
flexible mechanisms it is probably more appropriate to introduce tradable permits, cf. the
discussion in section 4.
 -RLQW,PSOHPHQWDWLRQ-,
In addition to quota trading, the Kyoto Protocol opens for Joint Implementation (JI) between
industrialised countries, i.e. between countries with quantified emission quotas under the
Kyoto protocol. Joint Implementation under the Kyoto Protocol involves co-operation
between two industrialised countries, with one (the investor country) funding and possibly
also conducting emission reduction projects in the other (the host country). It is important to
note that joint implementation under the Kyoto Protocol only can take place between two
countries both having an emission quota.
 The difference between emissions trading and joint implementation can be somewhat
unclear. In the JI-case the host country should transfer emission quotas to the investor country
corresponding to an agreed upon estimate of the emission reductions brought about by the JI-
project. In ordinary quota trading, quotas should be transferred from one country to the other
based an agreed price. JI quotas can thus be characterised as “quality assured” compared to
ordinary quotas bought on the international market.
Although it gives an impression of complexity, there are probably no difficulties in taking
part in JI and quota trading at the same time. The Protocol states, however, that private
entities should be authorised to participate in JI-projects. As in the case with quota trading,
such participation must be co-ordinated with the instruments applied domestically. A firm in
an investor country funding a JI-project in a host country has to be compensated in one way
or another. The compensation should be related to the size of the legal emission rights
transferred from the host country to the investor country as a result of the actual JI-project. If
emission taxes are used in the investor country, the compensations could be in form of
reduced emission taxes. If the company is trading in a domestic emission permit market, the
compensation could be an appropriate amount of emission permits.
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Future negotiation rounds are going to specify detailed rules both for quota trading and JI.
These rules will be decisive for the importance of the two mechanisms and will clarify the
concepts.
 &OHDQ'HYHORSPHQW0HFKDQLVP&'0
The Kyoto Protocol does not commit the developing countries to any quantified emission
targets. It is however little doubt that there is a considerable amount of low-cost emission
reduction options in this part of the world.  Consequently, there is demand for a mechanism
that allows the industrialised countries to move parts of their abatement efforts to the
developing countries. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which was defined and
established by the Kyoto Protocol (Article 12), is the mechanism for this. Its purpose is to
assist developing countries in achieving sustainable development with respect to GHG
emissions, and to assist industrialised countries in achieving their commitments under the
Kyoto Protocol.
Under CDM the developing countries will benefit from abatement projects taking part in their
countries. The host countries will acquire certified emission quotas corresponding to the
achieved emission reductions. The industrialised countries may use the certified emission
reductions accruing from such project activities to contribute to compliance with part of the
emission reduction commitments.
In addition to Joint Implementation and quota trading, the CDM is in other words a third
mechanism by which the industrialised countries could achieve certified emission quotas
abroad. It is too early to say how important CDM will be. Although it probably is a large
number of low-cost emission reduction projects in the developing countries, there might turn
out to be considerable difficulties in carrying out these projects within the context of the
CDM. In the absence of binding targets in developing countries it will be difficult to
determine the net emission reduction effects due to specific CDM projects, since nation-wide
indirect and direct effects must be counted. The net emission reduction effects of low-cost
abatement projects are particularly uncertain, since such projects may be close to being
profitable and, hence, may be carried out by the market itself in the near future. Moreover,
there are incentives to misrepresent the effectiveness of projects. The developing country in
which the projects are going to be carried out may have incentives for exaggerating the
project’s total net emission reduction effects as has also the investor country. It will be an
important task for the CDM to reveal such behaviour by host and investor countries.
The potential driving force behind CDM is that both industrialised and developing countries
would benefit from this mechanism. For industrialised countries taking part as buyers in the
ordinary quota market within the industrialised region, the CDM will serve as an important
outside option. If the sellers in the quota market lay claim to very high quota prices, the
buyers could refer to the possibility for acquiring low-cost quotas through CDM as a credible
threat in the bargaining process. It is in other words likely that the price on “CDM-quotas”
will constitute as a ceiling on the price in the quota market. It is however possible that CDM-
quotas could turn out to be a rationed good because of the obstacles mentioned above. In that
case the price on CDM-quotas will not constitute a ceiling on the price in the ordinary quota
market.
&,&(525HSRUW
Coordination of flexible instruments in climate policy
18
 ,PSOHPHQWDWLRQLVVXHV
In the previous sections, a considerable number of instruments and mechanisms were
described and discussed. It is however not unlikely that for example the Norwegian
authorities will use more or less all these different instruments and mechanisms in order to
achieve the Kyoto commitment.
So far direct regulation, CO2-taxes and voluntary agreements are the instruments applied in
Norway. A majority of the Norwegian parliament (Stortinget) has however already stated that
they want a domestic market for tradable permits established in Norway. In the international
arena it is likely that the Norwegian government will buy quotas in the ordinary quota market
and achieve certified emission rights through CDM. It is moreover likely that the Norwegian
government will, in accordance with the Kyoto protocol, allow Norwegian private entities to
invest in JI projects in for instance former Soviet Union (FSU) and the other economies in
transition to a market economy (the EIT-countries) as well as participate in CDM projects. It
is also probable, but not certain, that Norwegian firms may be allowed to participate in
international quota trade.
An issue then is whether the use of this complex set of instruments and mechanisms will give
rise to co-ordination problems. In broad terms one should at the outset underline that all the
instruments and mechanisms are supplementary to each other. The use of one instrument or
mechanism should not constitute a general hindrance towards the use of another tool. There
are however some exemptions to this rule. The most important one is that the choice of
instruments domestically must be seen in relation to what extent the flexible mechanisms are
applied and not least whether or not the private entities are allowed to buy quotas
internationally as well as nationally.
 2QHTXRWDSULFHLQWHUQDWLRQDOO\
At the international level one could acquire certified emission rights through both the CDM,
by Joint Implementation and through the ordinary quota market. Certified emission rights
from these three different sources will probably be fully interchangeable. That means that if
free access to the different mechanisms is provided, the price of quotas from these three
different mechanisms will converge. In the following we therefore assume that we could talk
about a single international quota price.
 *RYHUQPHQWVFKRLFHRIFOLPDWHSROLF\LQVWUXPHQWV
According to the Protocol private entities should be allowed to participate in JI projects and
the CDM.9 If the governments want to involve the domestic private entities in the flexible
mechanisms internationally, the domestic choice of climate policy tools must be closely
related to the flexible mechanisms.
                                                          
9
 Article 6 paragraph 3 on JI and Article 12 paragraph 9 on CDM.
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 7D[LQFRPELQDWLRQZLWKIOH[LEOHPHFKDQLVPV
Theoretically, private entities that have bought or acquired quotas on the international markets
may have any emission tax payment refunded when the acquired quotas are handed over to
the government. Let us have a look at two cases; when the domestic tax is either higher or
lower than the quota price.
If the domestic emission tax is above the international quota price, the domestic private
entities will reduce their emissions until the marginal abatement costs are equal to the quota
price. Furthermore, the private entities will buy a number of quotas equal to the residual
emissions internationally. These quotas are afterwards handed over to the government.
Consequently there will be no public net revenue from the GHG tax if this tax is above the
quota price.
If, on the other hand, the domestic tax is below the price level in the international market, no
domestic private entities will acquire quotas internationally. This solution is however not
cost-effective because the private entities in that case will abate only until the marginal
abatement costs are equal to the domestic tax, which is below the quota price internationally.
In other words, combining a domestic GHG tax with private entities’ participation in a well
functioning international market for quotas will cause problems. If the domestic tax is higher
than the international quota price, it will not generate any revenue. The government will
instead hold a set of quotas. If the domestic tax is set lower than the quota price, the domestic
abatement efforts will be inefficiently low. A solution could be to let the domestic tax vary in
accordance with the quota price just as another market set variable like for example the
domestic interest rate. It is, however, probably better to take the full step over to a system
with tradable emission permits, which we discuss below.
 'RPHVWLFPDUNHWVIRUHPLVVLRQSHUPLWV
If there is a well-behaved international market for quotas supplemented by CDM and JI, a
domestic market for permits is a natural solution. The government could sell all its quotas
according to the Kyoto Protocol. At the same time it must be required that all legal entities in
the country must acquire permits corresponding to their emissions. Due to the influence of the
international market, large sellers or buyers with substantial market power will not reduce the
efficiency of the domestic market for permits.
A national permit market seems like the obvious solution to the problem of choosing a
domestic control policy adapted to the Kyoto protocol. However, the potential public revenue
loss has to be considered, especially if permits are grandfathered to certain industries. Without
grandfathering, a domestic market for permits covering all gases and sources will require a
permit price of approximately NOK 110 pr. tonnes CO2 equivalent in order to avoid a public
revenue loss.10
                                                          
10
 The current Norwegian CO2-tax generates approximately 6 billion NOK. The Norwegian Kyoto quota is 55.75
mill. tonnes CO2. Such an amount of permits auctioned at a price equal to 107 NOK pr. tonnes CO2 mean a
revenue neutral reform.
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TXRWDPDUNHWV
As mentioned the Kyoto Protocol establishes JI, CDM and international quota trade as so
called flexible mechanisms. It is furthermore explicitly stated that private entities are to be
allowed to the use the JI and CDM mechanisms. A similar statement is not found with regard
to access to international quota trade. National control policies will closely interact with the
Kyoto mechanisms depending on whether or not private firms are allowed access to the
international quota market. In order to illustrate this interaction we look at two domestic
firms, one (firm 1) of which want to invest in the other firm (firm 2) with the purpose of
reducing GHG emissions in this latter firm. Possible compensation from firm 2 (the reducer)
to the firm 1 (the investor) is explored below with the help of two tables.
In table 1 it is assumed that domestic firms are not allowed
to trade freely on the international quota market. Four
situations are illustrated where none, one or both firms are
included in a domestic permit market. Inclusion in this
market is indicated with a ”Yes” in the tables. The firm(s)
not included in the domestic permit market is/are assumed
to be subject to a GHG tax with a tax rate of ti (i=1,2). The
permit price is denoted by p.
If the firm where the reduction takes place (firm 2) is
outside the domestic permit market, the reducer can
compensate the investor (firm 1) with the GHG tax avoided due to the investment project (t2
per tonnes CO2-equivalent reduced) whether or not the investor is included in the domestic
market. If, however, the reducer is included in the national permit market, the reducer can sell
the acquired permits at the price p and compensate firm 1 with this amount.
If, on the other hand Norwegian firms are allowed to trade internationally, the situation will
be as depicted in table 2.
 If both firms are outside the domestic quota market, the
reducer can compensate the investor with the GHG tax t2
stemming from the reductions undertaken. Alternatively,
the reducer can sell the newly created permits on the
international quota market where the investor can buy
them and claim compensation from the authorities for its
GHG tax t1. If the reducer is participating in the domestic
permit marked while the investor is not, the reducer can
either compensate the investor with the permit price p or
b
m
p
i
c
p
7DEOH: Possible
compensation from firm 2 to
firm 1 in the case where no
participation in international
quota trade is allowed
Firm 1\2 No Yes
No t2 p
Yes t2 p7DEOH: Possible compensation
from firm 2 to firm 1 in the case
where participation in
international quota trade is
allowed
Firm 1\2 No Yes
No t1/t2 p/t1
Yes t2/p p20
sell the permits on the international markets. In the latter
case, the investor can buy them and claim tax credits as
efore. If the investor is part of the domestic quota market while the reducer is outside, the
aximum compensation to the investor is the GHG tax credit t2. Alternatively, the new
ermits may be sold internationally for a price p, which then can be transferred to the
nvestor. Finally, if both parties are included in the domestic permit market, permits
orresponding to the achieved reductions can be transferred corresponding to the value of the
ermit, p.
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Given the likely situation that t1 > t2 > p, the above analysis illustrates the problems associated
with the operation of a limited domestic permit market together with a GHG tax regime for
those firms not included in the permit market. It also shows how international trading, if
allowed, can short circuit the division between the two systems.
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 &RQFOXVLRQ
The Kyoto Protocol must be the starting point for the choice of domestic climate policy
instruments. It is so far uncertain whether the required number of Parties will ratify the
Protocol for the Protocol to enter into force. At least emissions trading, but possibly also Joint
Implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism are, however, flexible mechanisms
that must be established before ratification by for example the USA can take place. Making
national preparations for domestic abatement efforts in order to be in compliance with the
Kyoto Protocol should therefore assume that the mentioned flexible mechanisms are
important elements of the international framework. The chosen domestic policy instruments
should in other words fit to an international market for quotas.
It has to be taken into consideration that if the Protocol enters into force all private entities
will have the right to acquire emission permits through CDM and JI-projects. It would be a
sort of undermining of the Protocol if the national authorities at the same time do not accept
these permits as legal emission rights. Thus, the corresponding emissions should not be
subject to for example emission taxes. In other words, the national policies can’t be seen in
isolation from the flexible mechanisms. Through these mechanisms the private entities are
linked to the international quota market and national policies must take that into
consideration.
Regarding the relationship between the flexible mechanisms and the different domestic policy
instruments, we have concluded as follows:
• The international market for quotas will be competitive only if governments do not
dominate it. That is the main reason why private entities should be allocated quotas from
their respective governments and be allowed to trade at the international market. Such a
regime would induce both a cost-effective division of domestic abatement efforts and a
cost-effective allocation of abatement internationally.
• Limiting the permit market to only some few industries combined with emission taxes in
other parts of the economy will reduce the cost-effectiveness if we rule out the possibility
that the emission tax varies in step with the permit price. Furthermore, if private firms are
allowed to trade quotas internationally, this will short circuit the barrier between firms
inside and outside a domestic permit market. Large traders in the domestic market will
also reduce the cost-effectiveness because a smaller market for permits may lead to
strategic behaviour.
• “Grandfathering” of national permits will not reduce the number of shutdowns unless
there are restrictions on the possibilities for selling the “grandfathered” quotas. Such
limitations on market transactions will reduce the cost-effectiveness of the instrument.
Future rules for the international quota market might furthermore ban such restrictions on
the tradable permits and might already be in conflict with the rules for free trade in the
European Economic Area (EEA).
• A GHG tax is a cost-effective instrument if the tax rates do not vary across sources and
sectors. In principle the domestic emitters could be allowed to acquire quotas through the
flexible mechanisms internationally and have the emission tax repaid in accordance with
the acquired number of quotas. Allocating tradable permits is however probably a more
convenient method for linking domestic abatement to the flexible mechanisms
internationally.
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• CDM is a supplement or enlargement to the ordinary quota market. The relationship
between Joint Implementation and emissions trading is somewhat unclear. The
development of the rules for JI and quota trading will probably elaborate that relationship.
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